Philosophical Methodology vs. the Modus Vivendi of Authentic Philosophy

I’ll probably edit and expand this later, but I had this thought a few days ago[1] and just wanted to put it out there. Have a blessed Easter Sunday!

Academic “disciplines” are defined and constituted by their methodologies,^[2] but philosophy does not have a “methodology” as such; it is a way of life, a modus vivendi ("mode of living"), a pursuit of truth in the broader sense, or the “love of wisdom” in the ancient and restricted etymological sense. Wherefore philosophy is not a “discipline” since philosophy as such transcends methodology qua modus vivendi.

“Schools of philosophy” may be considered “disciplines” since very often “schools” are defined not just by their founder or his works, but by his methodology, or by the methodology of extracting his thoughts and his way of thinking from his texts.

But such a narrowly-construed “philosophy” is dubitably philosophical, for in so reducing Philosophy to this-or-that methodology—and thereby creating a “philosophical discipline” properly so-called—the movement away from the “mode of living” has already been completed, for Philosophy is relegated to the solitary confinement of the academic department, cut off from communication with the broader world of wanderers, tourists, and pilgrims on their journey to the truth.

Only a way of living in pursuit of truth that transcends academic disciplinary methodology is worthy of the name Philosophy.

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[1] Original fragment composed 25 March 2016, ~12:55-1:17am PST (Good Friday).

[2] This was a notion I argued for and discussed in my Theology 401 final essay, reproduced on Philosophical Living as “The Propriety of Magisterial Authority in Academic Theological Discourse”.

The Propriety of Magisterial Authority in Academic Theological Discourse

Originally written 29 November-12 December 2014 as a final paper for Theology 401. I have corrected typos.

The Magisterium has an inherent right of judgment in theological discourse, without thereby derogating from the freedom of the academy.[1] Academic freedom is not destroyed by the perceived ‘interference’ of magisterial jurisdiction in academic discourse, for the raison d’ȇtre of the academy is precisely the pursuit and acquisition of truth, and theological truth properly inheres in and is thereby under the jurisdiction of the Teaching Authority of the Church, the Magisterium. This essay will explore the relationship between Magisterial authority and academic theology and will defend the Ratzingerian thesis by incorporating the thought of John Paul II and Cardinal Newman concerning theology, the academy, and the Magisterium.

            It is commonly thought today in the academic establishment—and it seems to me also in popular culture, or at least among the educated—that ecclesiastical authority is essentially foreign to the academic enterprise. With the sole exception of theology, I grant and defend this contention. While every other academic discipline is aimed essentially at the pursuit and acquisition of truth, from this it cannot be deduced that the Magisterium has jurisdiction in all matters of academic discourse.

All disciplines aim at truth, but not all truth is strictly speaking ‘theological’. Theological truth is that truth that concerns the Author of all truth, Truth itself. It is often fallaciously assumed from the divine title “Truth itself” that God is Truth in an all-encompassing, unqualified, univocal sense. In other words, it is often deduced from the “Truth itself” title that everything that is truth is a ‘part’ of Truth itself, that the resolution to the problem of the Univocity/Equivocity of Being is that being is unequivocally univocal. From this inaccurate deduction it is argued that all truth falls under the discipline of theology, thereby granting theology the status of Master Science under which all others are subsumed. As discussed above, the Magisterium has legitimate jurisdiction in theological matters. Therefore by this line of argument the Magisterium is granted jurisdiction over all academic discourse, since academic discourse is related to the truth, God is Truth, the truth is thereby essentially theological, and the Magisterium has jurisdiction over theological matters. This position cannot be responsibly maintained, either from the metaphysical stances regarding Univocity taken by the Magisterium during the Neoscholastic period, or by the Magisterial discussion of the proper relationship between faith and reason in St. John Paul II’s Fides et Ratio. In the thinking of John Paul, philosophy must remain faithful to its own methods as servant of the truth, so this precludes an excessive meddling in academic affairs.[2] However, John Paul also affirms that when philosophy touches upon the subject of God in its “ancillary” capacity, it thereby falls more directly under the legitimate jurisdiction of the Magisterium with regard to its truth-claims in a way similar to theology.[3]

Etymologically, “Magisterium” derives from magister, teacher. In the very notion of the Magisterium—the Teaching Office of the Church—lies the justification for its place in theology. It is the Church’s divine right to pronounce upon the subject of God and teach others the divine truths that have been revealed to her.

But the objection of the contemporary academic establishment—that rational argumentation, and not an authority external to the academy, should decide upon what is to be taught[4]—does seem reasonable and bears much weight. Why should “academic theology” exist as such? Why should theology be considered a science at all, accorded speculative rights in the academy?

Theology and the academy were not always together. With the rise of the university in the High Middle Ages, the proper locus of speculative theology was removed from the monasteries and monastery schools and transferred to the disputationes and lecture halls of the medieval academy.[5] Should not theology depart from the house of leaning and return to the house of prayer, the house of divine learning?

Mystical theology and other monastic theological traditions should be fostered, restored, treasured, and spread, but academic theology has its own right of existence, if not for the sake of itself, then for the sake all other disciplines. According to the thinking of Newman, theology belongs in the academy both because it is a form of universal knowledge (his university must teach all universal knowledge) and because without it the other disciplines would be essentially lacking. For Newman, every discipline belongs to a “circle of knowledge,”[6] each one modifying and supplementing the others, so that without any one discipline the circle would be essentially incomplete.[7] This is especially the case with theology, he argues, since theology is the “Science of God”[8] and its object transcends essentially the methodologies of all other sciences, at least in certain respects.[9] Theology complements the philosophical approach of the sciences. As John Paul teaches, theology helps philosophy grasp truths it would never have grasped,[10] and also corrects errors which would never have been corrected by mere rational argumentation.[11] The argument of Newman defends the rightful place of theology in the academy, and with this rightful place there comes magisterial jurisdiction over at least a sphere of academic discourse, i.e. academic theology.

In the last analysis, every discipline is defined by its methodology, and the methodology of academic theology necessarily incorporates the Teaching Authority of the Church as one of its constitutive elements. Magisterial jurisdiction is not foreign to academic theology; it contributes to its very essence as a discipline, since it is part of its methodology, its defining element. Academic theology deserves a place in the academy due to its character as universal knowledge concerning God, the author and source of all truth, the ultimate object of the academic enterprise. All truth-seeking leads either to God directly or in a roundabout way through the truth of metaphysical or material realities. The Magisterium properly has jurisdiction over theology in the academy, and this does not thereby weaken its position either as a methodologically-constituted discipline or as an intellectual endeavor. Rather, the Magisterium aids in the truth-seeking mission of the academy, the object of all academic pursuits and the object of academic theology.

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[1] J. Ratzinger, “The Nature and Mission of Theology” (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1995) 45-46

[2] John Paul II, “Fides et Ratio” (Boston: Pauline Books & Media, 1998) §49

[3] John Paul II, §77

[4] J. Ratzinger, 47

[5] I forget where I read this historical critique. Please excuse my inability to cite its source properly.

[6] John Henry Newman, “The Idea of a University” (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2013) 50

[7] Newman, 33-35

[8] Newman, 46

[9] Newman, 38

[10] John Paul II, §101

[11] John Paul II, §51

Descartes' Restoration of Philosophical Methodology

This is probably my favorite short paper I wrote during college. It perfectly articulates my philosophy vis-à-vis the Neoscholastic establishment viewpoint—that Descartes caused the downfall of philosophy, and that Aristotle should be restored and Descartes suppressed by the authority of the academy—by arguing that Descartes was a true philosopher, restored philosophy, and that no true philosophy can “ruin” philosophy, while a tyrannically enforced false philosophy most certainly can.

It was written in Humanities 401 on 18 November 2014, as an expansion of the paper from 9 September 2014, with some elements incorporated from the paper of 13 October 2014. I have made slight revisions.

Has Descartes helped or hindered philosophy? Evaluate. 

Descartes has made a positive contribution to the philosophical enterprise. He asks questions that did not even seem to occur to the ancient or scholastic philosophers, and in so doing demonstrates his brilliant originality of thought. Any time valid questions are posed and arguments given it cannot be held that philosophy is ruined, for that is precisely what philosophy is, the posing and answering of questions and the response or refutation of such answers in a constant journey of the human intellect. The unabashed search for truth which philosophy is demands such honest inquiry, free from the impositions and constraints of a systematized fundamental world view.

Descartes sought to transcend these systematic constraints. In his commentary on the Meditations, Descartes states that no one has ever seriously doubted that he exists, that he has a body, and that other material things exist. Descartes simply wonders if it is possible to prove the existence of these things without relying upon the accuracy of the senses. Actual doubt is improperly attributed to Descartes, when he really was engaging in systematic doubt; he never actually doubted the things which he was ‘doubting’ in his thought experiment. He was simply raising a novel question: whether the things we commonly apprehend though the senses can be known without the use and accuracy of the senses.

This was an honest intellectual and philosophical inquiry which the academic establishment of his day—and the establishment of the contemporary Neoscholastic Catholic college—condemns as a fruitless and disordered departure from the ways of Aristotelian epistemology. Descartes should be commended for preserving the integrity of the philosophic enterprise, for a philosophy that simply hands down by the authority of the academy and the ancients ‘perennial truths’ somehow placed above the realm of disputation is not properly called “philosophy” so much as a common belief system akin to faith.

As J. Ratzinger distinguishes in Introduction to Christianity, faith comes from a community and the authority and loving trust thereof, whereas philosophy is born of the lone philosopher and its true understanding is based upon an evaluation of the arguments advanced in defense thereof. Philosophy is essentially disputative, and the authenticity of the philosophic enterprise is dependent upon an impartial search for truth. The element of ‘the teacher’ and ‘the taught’ dicens stricte destroys this authentic and disputative search by replacing it with ‘facts’ passed on by authority. Philosophy is reduced at best to a history of what has been thought or to a common credo of the true, and at worst to a dogmatism or quasi-ideology, an ‘ism’ which can explain everything by deduction from a single premise (cf. H. Arendt)—that Aristotelian modes of thinking are always correct. Descartes preserves the integrity of philosophy in his thought by preserving the integrity of properly philosophic methodology. He serves as a great reminder that cultural and historical assumptions should not limit the heights of philosophic discovery.

It is granted that Descartes began the downfall of the supremacy and unquestioned legitimacy of the ancient philosophy and the Scholasticism which had been built upon it—a systemic doubt caused by systematic doubt, as it were.[1] But the need to save a system or founding principle of a system, e.g. “All knowledge begins with the senses,” should never necessitate the dismissal of novel modes of inquiry. If a question is posed and a response is given, it does not serve the pursuit of truth merely to dismiss it based upon the principles of one’s own system. Rather the response should be addressed directly within the metaphysical framework in which the question arose. The historical result of Cartesian thought was the decline of the unquestioned dominance of Aristotelian, and consequently Thomistic, modes of thinking, but by so doing Cartesianism has restored philosophy to its proper methodological integrity, and Descartes has thereby helped philosophy. He has done this not by displacing Ancient or Scholastic thought—which are properly philosophic in themselves and deserve an equal place in dialogue with post-Cartesian modern philosophy—but by transcending the tyranny of prescribed modes of thought and thereby restoring the truly philosophic endeavor. Descartes gave to philosophy an entirely new way of viewing reality by following the rigorous and fearless methodology of truth-seeking, and the necessary fruits of such effort can never ruin philosophy. Only dogmatic insistence upon established modes of thought, for no other reason than the authority of the ages, ruins philosophy.

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[1] I added “—a systemic doubt caused by systematic doubt, as it were.” on 7 October 2015, 7:25pm PST.

Reflections on Academia and Philosophical Methodology

There are many issues with contemporary academia; most scholars seem to acknowledge this, although their particular opinions on the issues and causes vary as much as Justice Kennedy’s opinions on the U.S. Supreme Court. I’ve been thinking about academia alot[1] lately; as a person who fancies himself a philosopher, and as a recent BA graduate, I have been thinking about the nature and interrelation of things such as “academia”, “the intellectual life”, and “philosophy”. Academia seems to maintain it has a monopoly upon the practice, or “profession” and “teaching”, of philosophy. But can “philosophy” really be a day-job? Can “philosophy” really be taught? Or does the nature of teaching philosophy actually corrupt the very nature of what is claimed to be transmitted? In other words, are the phrases “professor of philosophy”, “teacher of philosophy”, and “student of philosophy” actually contradictions in terms? Can “philosophy” be transmitted from teacher to student, or must it be practiced individually by the philosopher? What is the nature of that which is being transmitted from teacher to student, and is it true philosophy, or merely the faint resemblance of true philosophy, the outer appearance of true philosophy obscuring the essential corruption wrought by positivistic historical commentators?

Well if you cannot tell my answer to those questions, then you may need to take rhetoric lessons before you pursue authentic philosophy. In short, I think that philosophy cannot be taught or transmitted, that the very act of transmission properly understood corrupts the nature of the philosophical method, and that to understand philosophy, one must be a philosopher himself, one who analyzes the arguments of others in a dialectic of honesty in pursuit of truth. Such a methodology precludes “teaching” and necessitates active participation—“philosophizing”. Philosophy can only be philosophized among philosophers; it cannot be transmitted from teacher to student in an allegedly “philosophical” tradition, for such a tradition necessarily precludes authentic philosophy. Philosophy is better understood as a verb than a noun; the notion of “teaching” philosophy relies on the concept of philosophy as a positive corpus of thought produced by notable thinkers which can be dissected and fed to malleable students often incapably of true philosophy. Such academic passivity precludes philosophical activity.

The academy presses scholars by capitalist production to “produce” intellectual fruit through rigorous publishing requirements, which strangle genuine insight—that which must wait for the whim of the intellectus. Therefore academia is doomed to be positivist & merely historically descriptive, which has lead to its irrelevance and to the distortion of philosophy and the corruption of the very thinkers’ methodology.

Intellectual ideologies such as Radical Feminism and Neo-Thomism are not based on intellectus or ratio, but on anger and on the desire for bringing about a radical new world which they have envisioned as ideal, not so much as a result of their philosophy but as a goal towards which quasi-argumentative constructs which they would consider “philosophy” have been formulated. Since their conclusions have been preformulated, these “scholars” must conform reality and the free dialectic of truth to their narrow path toward their pre-ordained esoteric revelations. These movements (insofar as they can be classified as coherent “movements”) are not based on the quiet contemplation and intellectual activity of the truly philosophical life, but are falsifications of honest dialectics and are thereby disbarred from the category of authentic philosophy.

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[1] I firmly hold that “alot” is a true word, due to continuous popular usage and the nature of verbal contraction as proven time and again with words such as “to-day”. I have accordingly chosen to revert my autocorrect.