Mind over Matter: Soul vs. Brain

To me, it seems plausible that the mind could be explained by the brain, but it seems equally plausible (and to my metaphysical mindset, far more likely) that the mind is not explained by the brain, at least not fully. Bridging the gap between the physical and the non-physical has always fascinated me. It seems impossible to explain one by the other, as they seem to be two fundamental starting points or principles of reality. Even if the brain can explain the mind, the soul is not thereby explained away, nor is man fully explained.

Crick asserts that since the brain can explain the mind, then there is no need for a soul. But thinking and consciousness is not all that the soul does; hence the traditional distinction between mind and soul. How does one explain the difference between life and non-life, from the smallest bacterium to the largest mammal? The neuronal functionings do not seem to explain the life/non-life problem, while the soul, an anima-ting principle, does. Crick’s assertion would need to further answer the life/non-life problem in order to adequately show that there is no need for soul. He has only shown that there is no need for mind. The need for a soul cannot be explained away by the brain.

Fundamentally, there is a jurisdictional problem at play in this entire debate. The subject of our discourse is man qua man, a subject with immaterial and material elements, intellect and emotions, will and instinct. Modern academia has divided itself into disciplines with very specific jurisdictions and expertise areas, overall a positive development, unless such disciplines fail to interact with one another. Just like the Western intellectual movement towards individualism and the total self-sufficiency and independence of the individual from the group, each discipline has become wholly dependent upon itself, thereby assuming that its methodology—that which distinguishes one discipline from the others—is capable of explaining all of reality. But man is incredibly complex and intricate, an essentially interdisciplinary being. Hence any meaningful discourse on man must incorporate all the disciplines, for ultimately, all disciplines relate essentially to man. Man cannot be explained merely by metaphysics, nor can be explained merely by science. Man must be examined by a dialectic of all the disciplines. Only by such a dialectic can the essentially interdisciplinary being receive an adequate explanation.[1]

---

[1] Originally a Biology 402 final, 6 May 2015.

Philosophiæ Doctor a Scientist Doth Not Make

Must one be a Doctor of Philosophy to be a Scientist? A philosophical question.

An engineer of '90s PBS Kids fame by the name of Bill Nye “the Science Guy” has recently made many controversial headlines, contrapositioned by those within the “Scientific Community” who dismiss him and his statements as the simple opining of a mere engineer (pronounced with a lethal dosage of vitriolic venom). While this post takes no position with regard to the specific content of Mr. Nye’s statements, the recent controversy occasions a brief inquiry into the nature of what precisely constitutes the nature of “Scientist”—must one have been degreed a Philosophiæ Doctor (Ph.D.) to be a Scientist properly so called?

The Scientific Method prescribes certain criteria for a theory of natural phenomena to be held as generally valid, including rigorous and independently reproducible hypothesis testing. Such methodology necessarily presupposes peers of specialized, professional competence; hence the relegation of Natural Philosophy to the See of Academia, possessing plenary and exclusive jurisdiction over the theologians of “all things visible”.

With science thus wholly professionalized, all those lacking degreed credentials regulated by authority of the Academic See were henceforth declared anathematized. The scientific writings of non-scientists were systematically declared heretical by the Censor Scientiæ, and those claiming the title “Scientist” without the sanctioned ordination of the Academic See were declared excommunicated latæ sententiæ, notwithstanding the validity of specific truth-claims so advanced.

Those who dare defy the monopolistic power-grab of the Scientific Community are henceforth declared schismatic pseudo-scientists, wolves maliciously misleading the flock of secular citoyens.

But in the beginning it was not so.

The term scientist has a recent etymological gestation, brought to birth by the quasi-pontifical high priest of secular social theory Auguste Comte in the 1800s. Long before the Christian Era up until the dawn of the Modern, Natural Philosophy was the area of philosophic enquiry whose specific content encompassed the workings and wonders of the natural world. Natural Philosophy predates the Scientific Method, originating in Presocratic Greece, refined by Medieval Scholastics, and systematically developed by Renaissance thinkers of Neoplatonic Keplerian ilk.

Paradoxically, in the age of tyrants, monarchs, emperors and autocrats, the domain of licit scientific inquiry remained open to all persons, while in our own egalitarian age of parliaments, republics, populists and popularizers, democratic claim to legitimate science has been all but eradicated by the crippling totalitarian clutches of academic autocracy.

Natural Philosophy maintains no monopoly on the practice of systematic inquiry into the nature of the Cosmos; sed contra the ranks of natural philosophers are by nature open to any lover of wisdom who sincerely pursues the truth of physicality.

But in our New Dark Age, the democratic light of natural philosophy has now been all but extinguished, for a Ph.D. constitutes the prerequisite for attaining the rank of “Scientist” from which Academe grants no dispensation. Remedially, the Weltanschauung of Natural Philosophy must be restored to its rightful claim as definitional defender of those who profess the work of "Scientist", for if a genuine philosophia were again demanded of those declared Teacher of the Love of Wisdom, the swelling ranks of pseudo-scientific sycophants would surely begin to thin. 

 

 

 

(Mostly written 4 June 2017, 5:30pm; completed 2 December 2017, 6:30pm.)